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Abstract
Objective To examine users’ attitudes to
implementation of an electronic medical record
system in Kaiser Permanente Hawaii.
Design Qualitative study based on semistructured
interviews.
Setting Four primary healthcare teams in four clinics,
and four specialty departments in one hospital, on
Oahu, Hawaii. Shortly before the interviews, Kaiser
Permanente stopped implementation of the initial
system in favour of a competing one.
Participants Twenty six senior clinicians, managers,
and project team members.
Results Seven key findings emerged: users perceived
the decision to adopt the electronic medical record
system as flawed; software design problems increased
resistance; the system reduced doctors’ productivity,
especially during initial implementation, which fuelled
resistance; the system required clarification of clinical
roles and responsibilities, which was traumatic for some
individuals; a cooperative culture created trade-offs at
varying points in the implementation; no single
leadership style was optimal—a participatory,
consensus-building style may lead to more effective
adoption decisions, whereas decisive leadership could
help resolve barriers and resistance during
implementation; the process fostered a counter climate
of conflict, which was resolved by withdrawal of the
initial system.
Conclusions Implementation involved several critical
components, including perceptions of the system
selection, early testing, adaptation of the system to
the larger organisation, and adaptation of the
organisation to the new electronic environment.
Throughout, organisational factors such as leadership,
culture, and professional ideals played complex roles,
each facilitating and hindering implementation at
various points. A transient climate of conflict was
associated with adoption of the system.
Introduction
Electronic medical record systems have great potential
to improve the quality of health services. However, few
service providers have adopted them. Cost, limited evi-
dence linking adoption and improved outcomes, and
concerns about disruptions during implementation
may be important barriers.1–5
Electronic medical record systems may challenge
beliefs about how health care should be organised;
using physicians to enter data may be inefficient and
perceived as demeaning, and clinicians and managers
may need to learn how to use specific software, causing
frustration. Formal evaluations of electronic medical
records rarely address these organisational issues.6 This
missing information could enhance the viability of
existing electronic medical records and greatly inform
the implementation of new systems such as the UK
National Programme for IT (NPfIT) for the NHS.7–9
We examined the experience of implementing an
electronic medical record system in Kaiser Permanente
Hawaii. Using semistructured interviews, we identified
the critical events in the system implementation, the
impact of organisational culture and leadership, and
the effects on clinical practice and patient care
processes as perceived by the system’s users.
Methods
Background
Kaiser Permanente is the United States’ largest
non-profit healthcare system, serving 8.2 million
members in eight regions. Kaiser Permanente Hawaii
has 26 primary care teams in 15 clinics, and one hospi-
tal. It serves 234 000members across three islands. The
average team has four doctors, three nurses, and nine
other staff members.
Kaiser Permanente compared two electronic medi-
cal record systems in the 1990s, EpicCare, developed
by Epic Systems, and Clinical Information System
(CIS), jointly developed by Kaiser Permanente and
International Business Machines (IBM). In 1999, the
second-generation CIS system was chosen for all its
regions, starting with Hawaii.
Hawaii began to prepare for CIS in December
1999 with a planned starting date of October 2000.
After a 12 month delay related to the operating system,
the first site started using CIS in October 2001.
However, in 2003 the company decided that the Epic-
Care system had matured beyond CIS, and now was
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better able to meet its needs. All Kaiser Permanente
regions halted implementation of CIS and began plan-
ning for implementing EpicCare.
At that time, a third of the company’s Hawaiian
sites had implemented CIS fully, and the rest had read-
only access, some with order entry functionality. For
many in Kaiser Permanente Hawaii, the 28 month
experience had been, to use a Hawaiian surfing meta-
phor, truly a “wild ride.”
Interviews
JTS held semistructured, recorded interviews with
12 clinicians and five managers in four teams, located in
four clinics and the Kaiser Permanente hospital, and
with nine CIS project team members during March and
April 2003, about one month after the announcement
to halt CIS implementation. Preparation for the new
electronic medical record system began during the
interview period. In the clinics with CIS implemented, it
remained in use until replaced by EpicCare in 2004.
In the 60-90 minute interviews we sought respond-
ents’ views on four implementation issues: (a) critical
events in the implementation of CIS; the roles played by
(b) organisational leadership and (c) culture; and (d) the
CIS related changes in clinical practice (see bmj.com).
Interviews were transcribed and analysed inductively
and thematically. Responses were coded and collated to
create themes. Unclear responses were clarified with
interviewees. We held regular discussions to review
themes and clarify facts. This paper reports only themes
that were mentioned by at least four respondents.
Results
Critical processes in the implementation of CIS
Selection of the electronic medical record system
Only one respondent expressed approval of the CIS
choice at the time of the interview: 18 reported dissat-
isfaction with the choice, 10 thought clinicians had not
adequately “bought into” the decision, and seven iden-
tified conflicting priorities between the organisation as
a whole and individual clinicians.
“It was a bit of a turkey. I was actually on the group that
picked it. So we had to go out and defend a product that we
knew was flawed. And other people knew it was
flawed.”—Clinician, implementation team member
“With CIS it seems the highest priority was, ‘How can we
document as completely as possible and then extract infor-
mation easily so we can get paid and so maybe we can do
research?’ but had very little to do with taking care of the
patient who comes to your office.”—Clinician
Nine respondents criticised the higher than antici-
pated and escalating implementation costs, and felt
that Kaiser Permanente disproportionately bore the
software development costs.
“We had a 12 month preparation period. The product
wasn’t delivered for another 14 months. That affects your
culture.”—Clinician manager
“The delay had multiple consequences to our whole
experience with this. Lot of time goes by, lot of things happen
in people’s lives. And my internist needed to go do other
things. And my paediatrician also needed to move. So the
implementation date is shifting, and my players are
(too).”—Clinician
“Any improvements we had to pay for. So we’re paying for
IBM’s entire development costs.”—Clinician, implementa-
tion team member
Respondents consistently recalled suspecting that
CIS was the wrong choice for Kaiser Permanente
Hawaii, but may have been biased by the recent nega-
tive experience. At interview, 24 respondents were
optimistic that EpicCare would prove a better system.
All respondents thought the hardest challenge—to
change from paper to computer—had been accom-
plished with CIS and that the new implementation
would be easier. But at least eight respondents were
also cautious. Formal evaluations of the new EpicCare
system are ongoing.
“Even [EpicCare] is going to take us more time. On a bad
day we might see 30 patients. There’s no way that you can do
that on a computerised system unless you’re going to do as
lousy a note as possible.”—Clinician
Design and early testing
Twenty three respondents reported substantial soft-
ware problems.
“It was pretty clear that this product had a lot of problems—
from our very first site.”—Clinician, implementation team
member
“The problem for internal medicine is that they go through
amore complex process to arrive at a diagnosis, but CIS isn’t
really designed to do that. CIS assumes that the diagnosis is
known at the beginning, or shortly after the beginning, of
the visit.”—Implementation team member
Adaptation of the electronic medical record for widespread use
Four respondents noted the difficulty and expense of
modifying CIS software. Clinicians sought improved
usability and flexibility, whereas national headquarters
prioritised business and executive functions such as
accurate coding and reimbursement.
“We wanted to make a whole lot of changes, and [IBM]
would point out why it would take time and cost money, and
the smallest change would be a fight and it would cost tens
of thousands of dollars.”—Implementation team member
Adaptation of the organisation to the new electronic medical
record environment
Seventeen respondents reported that CIS had reduced
clinician productivity, primarily because of extra work,
such as processing laboratory result reports, entering
orders, and navigating through the system. Fourteen
clinicians reported that the extra time burdens from
using CIS (estimated to be 30-75 minutes a day)
persisted even after the initial learning period and
affected patient care (such as by making it more
difficult to fit in “overload patients”). The reasons
varied: eight respondents said CIS required too many
steps to accomplish simple tasks; 12 felt the system was
too cumbersome to accommodate the range of clinical
needs or patients with multiple problems, requiring
multiple templates; and nine reported a lack of clinical
capacity to absorb changes during implementation.
Although the CIS implementation included tem-
porary provision of extra clinicians to help with the
initial additional workload, several respondents
doubted whether they would be able to achieve
pre-CIS productivity levels.
“We’d started out in the high 90th percentile in terms of our
utilisation, so when we tried to add the constraints of the
system, basically it broke.”—Clinician
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Sixteen respondents said that CIS preparation had
revealed a variety of questionable practices and sharp-
ened people’s sense of accountability. Eleven respond-
ents believed implementing CIS had clarified staff
responsibilities for clinical decisions, but these tasks
required much unanticipated work.
“Somehow it has changed the psyche of people, they are
more aware of what they are putting in the chart. It’s almost
like they didn’t really care what they wrote on paper, but
now it’s electronic and people can read everything.”—
Implementation team member
Revised roles created shifts in work responsibilities,
which led some doctors to complain that they were
becoming expensive order entry clerks. Others
welcomed the greater accountability.
“No question in my mind, it’s forced me to be more organ-
ised, more accountable. It’s forced me to do what I should
have been doing all along.”—Clinician
Respondents also reported innovative adaptations,
such as allowing nurses to act as results managers to
screen laboratory results. Medical assistants started pri-
oritising electronic task items. Some clinics started
developed new appointment types, such as greater use
of telephone consultations.
“We’ve seen more sharing of responsibility, having nurses do
follow-up phone calls, and understanding specifically what a
[medical assistant] can do, and shifting some work off the
physicians on to others.”—Clinician, implementation team
member
Organisational culture and implementation
Respondents characterised Hawaiians as averse to
conflict and likely to interpret negative feedback as
personal criticism. The culture minimised active resist-
ance but also inhibited criticism before and during
implementation, thus depriving decision makers of
important feedback.
“Hawaii’s culture is very non-confrontational, you know, ‘Just
be nice, agree’; so the feedback has been relative to
that.”—Implementation team member
Organisational leadership and CIS
Fourteen respondents discussed the importance of
leadership. Respondents often stated that the electronic
medical record system selection process needed to be
more participatory, but in the implementation phase
some respondents valued decisive hierarchical leader-
ship. Respondents described local leaders as consensus
seeking, which at times exacerbated implementation
challenges or encouraged passive resistance.
Conflict
As these critical processes unfolded, a climate of
conflict associated with CIS arose. Five respondents
reported internal conflict between their commitment
to “going electronic” and scepticism about CIS, and
some initially receptive clinicians became alienated by
the implementation. A mingled feeling of relief and
loss was associated with the withdrawal of CIS.
“What got docs here frustrated was nobody really seemed to
listen. And they had to compromise their values and ethics
to help the system work. That’s where I saw very amiable,
nice, quiet people starting to talk stink behind the scenes.”—
Clinician
Discussion
Seven key findings emerged on the implementation of
the CIS electronic medical record in Kaiser Perma-
nente Hawaii:
x Many users perceived the initial selection of CIS to
be detached from the local environment
x Software design and development problems
increased local resistance
x CIS reduced clinicians’ productivity
x CIS initially clarified and then changed roles and
responsibilities
x Culture had varying effects: cooperative values
minimised resistance to change early on but also
inhibited feedback during implementation
x Leadership had varying effects: participatory lead-
ership was valued for selection decisions, but hierarchi-
cal leadership was valued for implementation
x An overall effect was a counter climate of conflict in
the company, which withdrawal of CIS resolved.
Implications for other healthcare organisations
A participatory process in selecting the system and in
fine tuning its capabilities is important. This grass roots
involvement is important to generate commitment;
there may never be a perfect software system for all
users, or which will achieve specific local goals.
Extensive software testing of the vendor’s claims for
baseline functionality and the system’s adaptability to
local needs is important before implementation. Users’
frustration with software problems can quickly escalate
and result in resistance to implementation.
Organisational culture and leadership—Building a
supportive, cooperative culture may pay dividends
during the stress of implementation, but special efforts
may be required to obtain critical feedback. Different
leadership roles and styles are needed in the process:
during selection of the system, participatory leadership
is needed; during implementation, however, decisive
hierarchical leadership is needed.
What is already known on this topic
Electronic medical record systems have great potential to improve the
quality of health services, but implementing such a system can be
extremely disruptive
Better understanding of organisational contexts and responses to
implementation may help to minimise disruption, but few formal
evaluations have been made
What this study adds
Introduction of an electronic medical record system to a non-profit
healthcare organisation created several challenges: many users felt the
selection of the system was detached from the local environment,
sparking doubt and resistance; problems with software development
increased local resistance, as did clinicians’ reduced productivity
The system first clarified and then changed roles and responsibilities—
often, though not always, for the better
The organisation’s cooperative culture minimised overt resistance to
change but also inhibited constructive feedback during implementation.
Leadership also had varying effects: participatory leadership was valued
during selection of an electronic system, but hierarchical leadership was
valued during implementation
Information in practice
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Roles, responsibilities, and relationships of clinical staff—
During the early stages of implementation, changes in
clinicians’ productivity may require extra staff and the
ability to make continuous adjustments. As the organi-
sation adapts to the new electronic system, the capabil-
ity is needed to document what care a patient received,
who provided it and when, so processes may need to
adapt to revised professional and legal standards.
Limitations of study
Our study captures only a snapshot view, during a
volatile phase of implementation and transition from
one electronic medical record system to another. The
respondents’ perceptions should be seen in this
context. In fact, another Kaiser Permanente region had
implemented an earlier CIS version successfully. How-
ever, our overall findings highlight issues likely to be
faced by organisations implementing or modifying an
electronic medical record system.
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Commentary: Trouble in paradise—learning from Hawaii
Sheila Teasdale
Scott and colleagues have set before us the sad story of
the failed implementation of an electronic medical
record system in hope that readers can learn from the
mistakes.1 The English National Programme for IT,2 as
the largest implementation of an electronic medical
record system in the world, is singled out by the
authors as being a potential beneficiary of the lessons
in this report.
There are parallels between what Kaiser Perma-
nente tried to do in Hawaii and what is planned for the
English NHS: Kaiser Permanente is a very large
healthcare organisation, covering a widely geographi-
cally dispersed population of eight million patients
across all health sectors (though this implementation
covered fewer than 250 000 patients). The overall goal
was to implement an electronic medical record for use
by all clinicians, providing an integrated system. This
evaluation looked specifically at the organisational
issues—consultation, communication, leadership, deci-
sion making, education and training, change
management—as it is well known (though often sadly
ignored) that getting these things right is crucial for
the success of any innovation that involves people
changing the way they do things in the workplace.
The reasons put forward for the failure of the imple-
mentation will come as no surprise to those with experi-
ence of working in health informatics: the initial decision
making was seen as remote from the clinical user base;
resistance was increased by poor product design; clinical
productivity was reduced (although this had been
planned for in the implementation, many staff felt that
they would be unable ever to return to their previous
levels of performance); roles and responsibilities were
unclear and were constantly changed; the cooperative
culture so prized by Hawaiians inhibited honest
feedback; leadership styles were not appropriate to the
successive phases of implementation; and a climate of
conflict was the result.
The authors suggest ways of avoiding such
outcomes—all of them involving people, not technology.
Their recommendations echo those of Nancy Lorenzi,
president of the International Medical Informatics
Association and an expert on change management in
health informatics. She recently enumerated strategies
for effecting successful change, none of which are new,
but without which failure is inevitable: set and
communicate clear objectives and formulate a strategic
plan (and modify when necessary); work at achieving
ownership of the plan by people at all levels; pay atten-
tion to the organisational culture (“culture eats strategy
for breakfast”) and whether it supports the changes
being implemented; develop leaders and champions for
the change (not just those in traditional positions of
power); be patient and resist false urgency; stay involved
and keep communicating; evaluate; seek feedback (and
act on it); plan ahead for the next phase of change.3
There are now encouraging signs of increasing
involvement of clinicians proficient in information
technology within much of the National Programme
for IT and an increasing level of informed and
constructive debate, which is being listened to by NHS
Connecting for Health. This is a positive and welcome
development and one which must be fostered
throughout the NHS; we simply cannot afford for this
implementation to fail.
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